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QUESTIONS OF ARBITRABILITY IN THE WORLD:
COMPARING THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
AND INDIA
Henry Sivils1
I. INTRODUCTION
If a matter is not arbitrable, then it may not be arbitrated. 2 Arbitrability, generally,
refers to the authority that an arbitrator possesses to decide a matter. 3 A challenge to that
authority is considered a “question of arbitrability.”4 There are three types of questions of
arbitrability: (1) substantive challenges that a dispute is not arbitrable under the terms of an
arbitration clause; (2) the contention that, despite substantive arbitrability, procedural
circumstances exist that prevent arbitration; and (3) “post-award attacks on an arbitrator’s
decision.”5 Of those three, “whether a matter is arbitrable under a given arbitration clause”
has had recent developments in its jurisprudence.6 This type of challenge is referred to as
“substantive arbitrability,”7 which itself contains specific “threshold arbitrability questions.”8
One example of this type of threshold arbitrability question is whether the parties have, by
contract, delegated challenges of substantive arbitrability to the arbitrator. 9
The United States and India have two similarities in their laws governing questions
of arbitrability. First, the United States and India both follow statutes and caselaw in their
arbitrability jurisprudence.10 Second, the United States and India are both pro-arbitration
countries.11 However, the United States and India have vastly different methods of deciding
what is arbitrable.12 Because of these differences, a comparative analysis of the two countries
1

B.A., University of Missouri, 2018; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2022; Associate
Member, Journal of Dispute Resolution, 2020-2021. I am grateful to Professor Lee for his insight, guidance,
and support during the writing of this Note, as well as the Journal of Dispute Resolution for its help in the
editing process.
2
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626-27 (1985).
3
92 Am. Jur. 3d Proof of Facts § 42 (2006).
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
See generally Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer and White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524 (2019).
7
Id. (contrast with “procedural arbitrability” referring to gateway matters such as “time limits, notice, laches,
estoppel, and other conditions precedent to an obligation to arbitrate”).; Howsam v. Dean Wittler Reynolds,
Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 85 (2002) (holding that the previously mentioned procedural arbitrability matters are for
arbitrators, not courts, to decide).
8
Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer and White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524, 527 (2019) (discussing the matter of
whether the contract delegates issues of substantive arbitrability to the arbitrator as “threshold arbitrability
question[s]”).
9
See generally id. at 531 (Schein holds that parties may, by contract, delegate substantive arbitrability
questions to the arbitrator, and that courts must respect this delegation and allow the arbitrator to decide.).
10
See infra Sections II(A) and III(A).
11
See generally Shivam Singh, Arbitrability of Fraud: Analysing India’s Problematic Jurisprudence, 8 INDIAN
J. ARB. L. 141 (2019); Ronald G. Aronovsky, The Supreme Court and the Future of Arbitration: Towards a
Premptive Federal Arbitration Procedural Paradigm?, 42 SW L. REV. 131, 131–33 (2012).
12
See infra Sections II(A), III(A), and IV.
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is appropriate. The result of this analysis will illustrate that, although the two countries are
seemingly similar, their respective jurisprudence would lead to opposite decisions in a
landmark case.
Section II will discuss American Arbitrability Jurisprudence, with an emphasis on
the American test for Arbitrability and the Mobile Real Estates case, which is a recent
decision that follows Supreme Court precedent and analyzes threshold questions of
arbitrability. Section III will discuss Indian jurisprudence on arbitrability, with an emphasis
on the Indian test for arbitrability and the Vidya Drolia case, which is a recent decision by the
Supreme Court of India. Section IV will attempt to analyze how the United States Supreme
Court would have decided Vidya Drolia with a special interest in how the Court’s reasoning
would have differed from the original deciding court. Section V will conclude with a
discussion of what these differences show about pro-arbitration legislation.
II. AMERICAN ARBITRABILITY JURISPRUDENCE
A. The United States’ Test for Arbitrability
American arbitration law is codified in statute in the form of the Federal Arbitration
Act (“FAA”),13 and American arbitration law is discussed at length in caselaw. 14 Section 2 of
the FAA states that an agreement to arbitrate “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”15
Section 2 impliedly gives courts the power to decide under certain grounds that an agreement
to arbitrate is unenforceable or that an award will not be enforced. 16
A question of arbitrability arises when a party disputes whether it is bound by an
arbitration clause.17 Questions of arbitrability are for a court to decide, unless otherwise
agreed to by the parties.18 If parties make an agreement to submit questions of arbitrability to
an arbitrator, then courts will honor that agreement and allow the arbitrator to decide the
question.19 The standard of proof used to decide whether parties have made such an
agreement is “clear[] and unmistakabl[e]” evidence that the parties intended to submit
questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator.20 While courts typically hold a presumption in
favor of enforcing an arbitration agreement, this standard is a flip on that presumption. 21

13

The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-16 (West 2019).
See generally Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962); John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston,
376 U.S. 543 (1964); AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643 (1986); First Options of
Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995); Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002); RentA-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010).
15
9 U.S.C.A. §§ 2, 9-12 (West 2019).
16
Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 582 (2008).
17
Howsam, 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002).
18
Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238, 241 (1962); John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S.
543, 546–47 (1964); AT & T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986); Kaplan,
514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995).
19
AT&T Techs., Inc., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986); Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995).
20
AT&T Techs., Inc.,, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986).
21
Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944–45, (1995).
14
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Thus, if an agreement is silent on the issue of who decides a question of arbitrability the
presumption is that a court shall decide the issue. 22
Despite the court typically having a presumption in favor of enforcing arbitration
agreements, that presumption is flipped when considering whether the issue of arbitrability
has been assigned to the arbitrator.23 Instead, “[c]ourts should not assume that the parties
agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is clear and unmistakeable evidence that they did
so.”24 There are various rationales for this flip in presumption. First, because a party can be
compelled to arbitrate only issues that it has agreed to arbitrate, courts are hesitant to grant the
arbitrator the power to decide issues of arbitrability when the arbitrator has not explicitly been
given this power.25 If an arbitrator were given this power by presumption, there is a chance
that parties resisting arbitration would be forced to arbitrate matters that they otherwise would
have expected a court to decide.26 Furthermore, while the Court has typically held that the
FAA has the goals of speed and rapid resolution, those goals are not applicable to this
inquiry.27 Instead, the objective is to ensure that contracts are enforced according to their
terms and the intention of the parties in agreement.28 With this in mind, a discussion of a
recent decision that follows all of the above precedent is prudent.
B. Mobile Real Estate, LLC v. NewPoint Media Grp., LLC29
The court in Mobile Real Estate, LLC v. NewPoint Media Grp., LLC tackles many
issues in regards to questions of arbitrability. The case is current, having been decided in
2020.30 In their analysis, the court in Mobile Real Estate, LLC discussed assignment of
questions of arbitrability to arbitrators and the effect of incorporation of arbitral institutional
rules.31 The court in Mobile Real Estate, LLC followed Supreme Court precedent closely,32
indicating that Mobile Real Estate, LLC is going to remain good law for the foreseeable
future.
1. Factual Background
Plaintiffs Mobile Real Estate, LLC (“MRE”) produced a software application that
defendants NewPoint Media Group, LLC utilized through a series of two services agreement

22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotations removed).
Id. at 945.
Id.
Id. at 947.
Id.; Volt Info. Sci.’s, Inc. v. Bd. Of Tr.’s of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478–79 (1989).
Mobile Real Est., LLC v. NewPoint Media Grp., LLC, 460 F. Supp. 3d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
Id.
Id. at 463–69.
Specifically, the court follows Howsam and AT&T Techs, Inc. Id. at 468–69.
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contracts.33 MRE sued Newpoint in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York for breach of contract.34
In June, 2013, the parties entered into a “Master License and Services Agreement”
(hereinafter “first agreement”).35 The first agreement included a dispute resolution provision
which mandated that disputes unable to be settled within sixty days would be submitted to
arbitration in Georgia.36 The provision also incorporated the American Arbitration
Association (“AAA”) Commercial Arbitration Rules.37
On March 10, 2014, the parties executed a “Second Master License and Services
Agreement” (hereinafter “second agreement”) to expand the services sold beyond the scope
of the first agreement.38 The second agreement was silent about mandated arbitration and
included a forum selection clause stating that any actions would be brought in either federal
or state court in Westchester County, New York.39 The second agreement also included a
provision stating that it was the entire agreement between the parties in the subject matter
included and that the second agreement superseded any agreements or understandings on the
subject matter it included.40
After the execution of the second agreement, the parties continued to perform their
obligations under the first agreement.41 On April 1, 2014, the parties executed an amendment
to the first agreement (hereinafter, “first amendment”). 42 The first amendment, among other
things, included a recognition of the second agreement and a statement that the first
agreement was still in full force and effect, except where modified.43
On October 13, 2014, the parties executed an additional amendment to the first
agreement (hereinafter, “second amendment”). 44 The second amendment once again
reiterated that the first agreement remained in full force and effect. 45 Beginning on July 11,
2016, the parties began talks of how to integrate or terminate one of the two existing
agreements.46
On July 27, 2016, the parties executed an amendment to the second agreement
(hereinafter, “wind-down agreement”).47 Under the wind-down agreement, the parties would
transition to operating solely under the second agreement. 48 The first agreement and the first

33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Mobile Real Estate, LLC v. NewPoint Media Grp., LLC, 460 F. Supp. 3d 457, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
Id.
Mobile Real Est., 460 F. Supp. 3d at 463.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 464.
Id.
Mobile Real Est., 460 F. Supp. 3d at 465.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Mobile Real Est., 460 F. Supp. 3d at 465.
Id.
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and second amendment were to be canceled.49 Finally, the wind-down agreement reiterated
that, except where changed, the second agreement remained in full force and effect.50
On December 16, 2019, MRE filed its complaint in the district court, and, on
December 20, 2019, NewPoint filed a demand for arbitration with the AAA in Georgia.51
NewPoint attempted to arbitrate the dispute, which received much resistance from MRE, and
both parties filed dueling motions (NewPoint filed a motion to compel arbitration and MRE
filed a motion to vacate or stay arbitration) in the District Court. 52 On February 21, 2020, the
court issued an order granting MRE’s request for a temporary stay of arbitration to decide the
motions and grant additional orders.53 From this posture, the court analyzed the facts of the
case and ultimately decided whether the action should move forward in court or in arbitration.
2. Rationale
The court held that the parties had clearly and unmistakably delegated any issues of
arbitrability to the arbitrator.54 The Second Circuit generally treats motions to vacate/stay
arbitration, and motions to compel arbitration, like summary judgment motions. 55 Similar to a
ruling on a summary judgement motion, the court reasoned that there was not a genuine
dispute as to the material facts of the case, and, therefore it was proper for the court to decide
whether the parties must move to arbitration as a matter of law. 56
The court noted that the parties’ disputes were a question of arbitrability. 57 The
Second Circuit utilized a two-part test to decide such questions: “(1) whether the parties have
entered into a valid agreement to arbitrate, and, if so, (2) whether the dispute at issue comes
within the scope of the arbitration agreement.”58 However, an overarching dispute that the
parties have is who should decide questions of arbitrability.59 NewPoint says that the
arbitrator should decide, and MRE says that a court should decide. 60 The court stated that the
analysis should follow two steps: (1) determine whether the parties have entered into a valid
agreement to arbitrate, and (2) then determine who should decide questions of arbitrability. 61
The court noted that neither party disputed the existence of a contract in the form of
the first agreement.62 Instead, MRE argued that their actions fell under the second agreement,
that the first agreement was contracted away, and that the second agreement superseded the

49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62

Id.
Id.
Id. at 466.
Id. at 467.
Mobile Real Est., 460 F. Supp. 3d at 468.
Id. at 472.
Id. at 468.
Id. at 468–69.
Id. at 477.
Id. at 469 (quoting In re Am. Express Fin. Advisors Sec. Litig., 672 F.3d 113, 128 (2d. Cir. 2011)).
Mobile Real Est., 460 F. Supp. 3d at 469.
Id. at 471.
Id. at 470–73.
Id. at 471.
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first agreement in its subject matter.63 The court handled all of these arguments in step two of
the analysis.
The court classified all of MRE’s arguments as questions of arbitrability.64
Therefore, it is arguable that the most important question was whether the court or the
arbitrator should decide the issue of arbitrability. Citing Supreme Court and Second Circuit
precedent, the court stated a familiar standard: without “clear and unmistakable evidence” to
the contrary, a court should decide questions of arbitrability. 65 The inquiry was whether there
is clear and unmistakable evidence of the parties’ delegating questions of arbitrability to the
arbitrator under relevant state law.66 Citing Second Circuit precedent, the court noted that if
parties explicitly incorporate rules of an arbitral organization that gives the arbitrator the
power to decide questions of arbitrability, then they have clearly and unmistakably done so
and a court may not interfere.67
NewPoint and MRE, in their first agreement, incorporated the Commercial
Arbitration Rules.68 Those rules provide that an arbitrator “shall have the power” to rule on
“the arbitrability of any claim or counterclaim.”69 Therefore, the court held that the parties
had clearly and unmistakably delegated questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator. 70 The
court’s rationale boiled down to one sentence was: “[B]ecause the court has determined that
the First Services Agreement “clearly and unmistakably” delegates issues of the “existence,
scope[,] or validity of the arbitration agreement” to an arbitrator, [] the effect of the [second
amendment] on the arbitration agreement in the [first agreement] is for the arbitrator to
decide.”71 Therefore, the court ordered the parties to arbitrate on these issues. 72 The takeaway
from Mobile Real Estate, LLC is that American courts focus on the agreements between
parties.
III. INDIAN ARBITRABILITY JURISPRUDENCE
There are two categories of Indian jurisprudence to examine in reference to
questions of arbitrability. The first category is pre-Vidya Drolia cases. This category includes
foundational cases, which shape the law leading up to Vidya Drolia,73 and various sections
and amendments to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act (hereinafter ACA), which embody
the spirit of pro-arbitration that Indian law seeks to embody. The second is post-Vidya Dolia

63

Id.
Id. at 471–76.
65
Mobile Real Est., 460 F. Supp. 3d at 469.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 463.
69
American Arbitration Association, Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures (“AAA Rules”)
R-7(a) (Oct. 1, 2013), https://adr.org/sites/default/files/Commercial%20Rules.pdf.
70
Mobile Real Estate, 460 F. Supp. 3d at 477.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Booz-Allen & Hamilton Inc v. Sbi Home Finance Ltd. & Others, (2011) 5 SCC 532 (India); Sukanya
Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Jayesh H. Pandya & Another, (2003) 5 SCC 531 (India); A. Ayyasamy v. A.
Paramasivam & Others, (2016) 10 SCC 386 (India); Vimal Kishor Shah & Others v. Jayesh Dinesh Shah &
Others, (2016) 8 SCC 788 (India).
64
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cases, which include a discussion of the law as it exists in the aftermath of this
groundbreaking Indian Supreme Court Decision and its test of arbitrability based largely on
whether an action is in personem or in rem.74
A.

The Indian Test for Arbitrability

1. Indian Jurisprudence Pre-Vidya Drolia vs. Durga Trading Corporation
A discussion of Booz-Allen & Hamilton Inc v. Sbi Home Finance Ltd. & Others is
necessary because it is the Indian Supreme Court foundational case for arbitrability. 75 Booz
Allen is famous for its less-than-perfect test, and the decision in Booz Allen was ultimately a
factor for the Indian Government’s amendments to the ACA. 76 While the Amendments had
an effect on the precedential value of portions of Booz Allen,77 the case still retains its infamy,
even post-amendment, as it continues to fuel Indian legal research on arbitrability. 78 The
court’s test, which remains good law, depends largely on whether the action was brought in
personam or in rem.79
In Booz Allen, the Supreme Court of India held that there are three facets to
arbitrability in an Indian court: (1) “whether the disputes, having regard to their nature, could
be resolved by a private forum chosen by the parties;” (2) “[w]hether the disputes are covered
by the arbitration agreement;” and (3) “[w]hether the parties have referred the disputes to
arbitration[.]”80 Facet one involves a question of whether the dispute falls under the exclusive
jurisdiction of a public forum (a court) or whether the dispute may be submitted to a private
forum (arbitration).81 If the dispute is in rem, then the matter is not arbitrable.82 If the dispute
is in personam, then the dispute is arbitrable.83 Facet two is straightforward in asking whether
the parties’ dispute falls within their applicable arbitration provision. 84 Facet three is related
to the process of referring to arbitration, which is required by Indian law. 85 If the parties are
attempting to arbitrate a claim or counterclaim which was not referred/submitted to arbitration
in India’s formalized process, then that specific claim or counterclaim is deemed not
arbitrable.86

74

Ajar Rab, Defining the Contours of the Public Policy Exception – A New Test for Arbitrability in India, 7
INDIAN J. ARB. L. 161, 163 (2018).
75
See generally Singh, supra note 11; Rab, supra note 74, at 161.
76
Singh, supra note 11; Rab, supra note 74, at 161
77
See Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, No. 26 of 1996 § 8 INDIA CODE (2021).
78
Both the Rab and Singh articles are good examples and both articles came out years after the 2015
amendment which overruled portions of Booz-Allen & Hamilton Inc.
79
See Rab, supra note 74, at 163.
80
Booz-Allen & Hamilton Inc. v. SBI Home Fin. Ltd. & Others (2011) 5 SCC 532 ¶ 21 (India).
81
Id. This facet is where the court eventually discusses the distinction between in rem and in personam
disputes, id. ¶ 23.
82
Id. ¶ 23.
83
Id.
84
Id. ¶ 21.
85
Booz-Allen & Hamilton Inc. v. SBI Home Fin. Ltd. & Others (2011) 5 SCC 532 ¶ 21 (India).
86
Id.
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The Court offered insight into its jurisprudence on arbitrability in Sukanya Holdings
Pvt. Ltd. v. Jayesh H. Pandya & Another,87 in which the court held that claims could not be
bifurcated into arbitrable and non-arbitrable groups.88 In Sukanya Holdings, the Court was
asked to bifurcate proceedings between parties that had signed an arbitration agreement and
parties that had not signed the agreement.89 The Court declined to bifurcate proceedings, and
stated that to do so would go against the intent of the legislature that enacted the ACA. 90 As a
result of this decision, disputes must be deemed entirely arbitrable for the dispute to be
eligible for arbitration.91 If some of a dispute is deemed arbitrable and some of a dispute is
deemed not arbitrable, then the entire dispute is not arbitrable. 92
The Supreme Court of India decided in A. Ayyasamy v. A. Paramasivam and Others
93
that serious allegations of fraud would render a dispute non-arbitrable. In Ayyasamy, the
court was asked to mandate arbitration over allegations of fraud. 94 The Court held that mere
allegations of fraud were not enough to defeat arbitrability of a dispute. 95 However, there is a
line where mere allegations become serious allegations, and at that point the dispute would
not be arbitrable.96 Alas the Court did not give guidance on where this line is drawn. 97 The
Court reasoned that there must be a balance between the intentions of the ACA and the
promotion of faith in arbitration in commercial settings. 98
Finally, in Vimal Kishor Shah & Others vs Jayesh Dinesh Shah & Others, the
Supreme Court of India decided whether a dispute with a statutorily provided adjudication
method could be arbitrated.99 In Vimal Kishor Shah, the court held that because the dispute
was governed by The Indian Trust Act of 1882, which provided a particular forum for
grievances, the dispute was not arbitrable.100 This means that, in India, disputes governed by
a statutory scheme that prescribe a particular forum are not arbitrable. Although the
agreement is still important to Indian jurisprudence on arbitrability, it would seem that there
other policy concerns at play as well.
2. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act (hereinafter “ACA”) is the Indian equivalent
of the FAA. Perhaps the largest difference between the ACA and FAA is that the ACA has

87

Sukanya Holdings Priv. Ltd. v. Jayesh H. Pandya & Another, (2003) 5 SCC 531 (India).
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Sukanya Holdings Priv. Ltd. v. Jayesh H. Pandya & Another, (2003) 5 SCC 531 (India).
93
A. Ayyasamy v. A. Paramasivam & Others, (2016) 10 SCC 386 (India).
94
Id. ¶ 2.
95
Id. ¶ 57.
96
Id. ¶ 5.
97
Id.
98
Id. ¶ 24.
99
Vimal Kishor Shah & Others v. Jayesh Dinesh Shah & Others, (2016) 8 SCC 788 (India).
100
Id. ¶¶ 15, 54, 61.
88
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been amended multiple times since its original enactment. 101 Similar to the FAA, the
Supreme Court of India interprets the ACA in its jurisprudence. 102 A knowledge of relevant
portions of the ACA will be necessary to effectively analyze Vidya Drolia under the
American concept of incorporation.103
The process for referring parties to arbitration is straight forward. According to the
ACA, if a judicial authority finds that an arbitration clause prima facie exists, then that
authority must refer the parties to arbitration.104 This referral is compulsory “notwithstanding
any judgment, decree or order of the Supreme Court or any Court[.]”105 This is problematic
when considering the precedential value of following Indian Supreme Court opinion.
The ACA has comparable language to the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules
when referring to the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals.106 Under the ACA, “[t]he arbitral
tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including ruling on any objections with the respect
to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement…” 107 This section is similar to the
AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules R-7(a) that states that an “arbitrator shall have the power
to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence,
scope, or validity of the arbitration agreement or to the arbitrability of any claim or counter
claim.”108 The ACA does not include the word “scope of agreement” in the list of objections
that an arbitrator may rule on, and does not include “arbitrability of any claim or counter
claim.”109 While this difference is small, it will become important when analyzing
incorporation of rules later.110 However, the ACA section 16 does discuss arbitral tribunals
deciding issues of scope later in subsections 3 and 5. 111 Section 16(3) states that a plea that
the arbitral tribunal is exceeding its scope must be raised as soon as the issue presents itself.112
Section 16(5) states that the arbitral tribunal shall decide this matter, and if it rejects the plea,
it will continue with proceedings.113

101
See Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, No. 26 of 1996, INDIA CODE (2019 amendment).; see also
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, No. 26 of 1996, INDIA CODE (2015 amendment).
102
See A. Ayyasamy v. A. Paramasivam & Others, (2016) 10 SCC 386 ¶ 57 (India).
103
See supra Section II(B)(2) for an example of the effects of incorporation.
104
See Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, No. 26 of 1996, INDIA CODE § 8 (2021).
105
Id. (emphasis added).
106
Compare Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, AMERICAN ARBITRATION
ASSOCIATION R-7(a) (Amend. 2013), https://adr.org/sites/default/files/Commercial%20Rules.pdf, with
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, No 26 of 1996, INDIA CODE § 16 (2021).
107
See Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, No. 26 of 1996, INDIA CODE § 16 (2021).
108
Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION R-7(a)
(Amend. 2013), https://adr.org/sites/default/files/Commercial%20Rules.pdf.
109
Compare Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, AMERICAN ARBITRATION
ASSOCIATION R-7(a) (Amend. 2013), https://adr.org/sites/default/files/Commercial%20Rules.pdf, with
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, No. 26 of 1996, INDIA CODE § 16 (2021).
110
See supra Section II(B)(2) for an example of the effects of incorporation.
111
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, No. 26 of 1996, INDIA CODE §§ 16(3), 16(5) (2021).
112
Id. § 16(3).
113
Id. § 16(5).

135
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship
Repository, 2022

9

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2022, Iss. 1 [2022], Art. 10

THE JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
B. Vidya Drolia vs Durga Trading Corp.
Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corp.is one of the most recent decisions by the
Supreme Court of India on arbitrability.114 While many of the previous court decisions add to
the law, the Vidya Drolia opinion offered clear guidance to future courts deciding issues of
arbitrability.115 Vidya Drolia has already been cited in further Indian Supreme Court
decisions, such as Suresh Shah,116 and it appears that the law made in Vidya Drolia is here to
stay.117 Furthermore, the issues that the court in Vidya Drolia had the opportunity to hear and
decide are in line with some of the issues decided by the American court in Mobile Real
Estate.118
1. Factual Background119
The dispute in Vidya Drolia arose from a landlord-tenant dispute involving a
commercial lessee and lessor.120 The tenancy agreement included provisions that stipulated
rent amount, and that the tenant would leave the premise at the end of the lease term, which
was ten years.121 The agreement also contained Clause 23, which was an arbitration
agreement.122
Clause 23 stated that “in case of any disputes, differences and/or claims arising by
and between the parties out of this agreement and/or in respect to the subject matter of this
agreement” that the parties would go to arbitration. 123 Clause 23 stipulated the number of
arbitrators and how those arbitrators would be appointed. 124 Clause 23 named the venue of
the arbitration as being located within the “Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of the High

114

Shahezad Kazi & Gladwin Isaac, India: Supreme Court of India Clarifies ‘What is Arbitrable’ under Indian
Law and Provides Guidance to Forums in Addressing the Question, MONDAQ (Jan. 7, 2021),
https://www.mondaq.com/india/trials-appeals-compensation/1023030/supreme-court-of-india-clarifies-39whatis-arbitrable39-under-indian-law-and-provides-guidance-to-forums-in-addressing-the-question.
115
Id.
116
Suresh Shah v. Hipad Tech. India Priv., 2020 SCC OnLine 1038 (India) (affirming the decision in Vidya
Drolia).
117
Kazi & Isaac, supra note 114.
118
Namely, the threshold arbitrability question: who decides, the court or the arbitrator? See supra Section
II(B) for a discussion of Mobile Real Est..
119
This case came in two parts. The case was first heard by the Supreme Court of India in February of 2019,
and it was reheard in December of 2020 after the Supreme Court of India released a separate decision that was
contrary to its first holding on this case. Because of this, the structure of the opinions are that the second
opinion (and the one that this paper refers to when discussing the law) is devoid of a factual background.
Therefore, facts from Vidya Drolia I will be cited. But, the two cases (despite differing citations) are the same
case, but for their holdings. For a full discussion of the procedural posture see Mohammad Kamran, Kshama A.
Loya & Vyapak Desai, Are Tenant-Landlord Disputes Arbitrable? Supreme Court of India Overturns Its Own
Judgement, 11 NAT’L L. REV. (Jan. 15, 2021), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/are-tenant-landlorddisputes-arbitrable-supreme-court-india-overturns-its-own.
120
Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corp., (2019) SCC 358 ¶ 2(i) (India) [hereinafter Vidya I].
121
Id. ¶ 2(ii)–(iii).
122
Id. ¶ 2(iii).
123
Id.
124
Id.
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Court at Kolkata.”125 Finally, Clause 23 stated that the arbitration proceedings would be
governed by the ACA “with all statutory modifications[.]” 126
When the time came for the tenant to exit the premises, the tenant refused to leave
the premises.127 The landlord sent notice to the tenant of the landlord’s intention to arbitrate
with the tenant.128 The landlord brought an action to court under section 11 of the ACA for
the court to appoint an arbitrator.129 Neither party disputed the existence of an arbitration
agreement.130 Instead the argumentation centered on whether the dispute was arbitrable.131
2. Rationale
The court reached five distinct holdings in Vidya Drolia.132 Of those five, the last
three are of interest to this paper.133 First, the court held that unless a party presents a prima
facie case of the nonexistence of a valid arbitration agreement, then the court must (under
Section 8 and section 11 of the ACA) refer the matter to arbitration. 134 The court reasoned
that referring the matter to the arbitral tribunal for a full trial is most in-line with the ACA
amendments, and that if a prima facie finding were possible then a full trial would not be
necessary.135
Second, the court held that if the validity of the arbitration agreement cannot be
determined on a prima facie basis, then the court should defer to referring the matter to
arbitration.136 The court states clearly, “when in doubt, do refer.” 137 The court reasoned
similar to its previous holding, that the job of the court was to decide prima facially if an
agreement to arbitrate was valid, any further dispute would be submitted to the arbitral
tribunal.138
Third, the court squarely limited the role that future courts have in determining
arbitrability by limiting the courts role of review only to determining a prima facie case of
validity of an arbitration agreement139 Furthermore, the court limited the way that a future
court may determine validity.140 The four factors a court may consider are: (1) whether the
125

Vidya I, (2019) SCC 358 ¶ 2(iii).
Id.
127
Id. ¶ 2(v).
128
Id.
129
Id. ¶ 2(vi).
130
Id. ¶ 2(iii)-(vii).
131
Vidya I, (2019) SCC 358 at ¶ 2 (vii).
132
Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corp., (2021) 2 SCC 1 ¶ 75 (2020) (India) [hereinafter Vidya II].
133
The two holdings that are not discussed in this paper are as follows: (1) section 8 and section 11 of the ACA
have the same scope “with respect to judicial inference”; and (2) subject matter arbitrability cannot typically be
decided at the section 8 and section 11 stage of proceedings, unless the matter is clearly not arbitrable. Id. at ¶
75(a)–(b).
134
Id. ¶ 75(c).
135
Id. ¶ 66-68.
136
Id. ¶ 75(d).
137
Vidya II, (2021) 2 SCC 1 at ¶ 75(d).
138
Id. ¶ 68.
139
Id. ¶ 75(e).
140
Id.
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arbitration agreement was in writing; (2) whether the arbitration agreement was contained in
exchanges of letters/telecommunications; (3) whether the arbitration agreement is a contract;
and (4) rarely, whether the subject matter of the dispute is arbitrable. 141 The court reached
this decision primarily through investigation of its own precedent.142
IV. IF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES DECIDED VIDYA
DROLIA
The only issue for discussion here is whether the Court would compel arbitration for
the arbitrator to decide questions of arbitrability, 143 or if the Court would decide the question
itself. Although it is impossible to predict with certainty, it is likely that the Court would not
compel arbitration in the case of Vidya Drolia.
There are two limitations to this discussion about Vidya Drolia. First, Vidya Drolia
must be imagined to originate in a particular jurisdiction within the United States. This is
because Federal Courts, including the Supreme Court, consider threshold issues of
arbitrability as matters of contract, which requires an investigation of state law.144 Because
this paper has already discussed Mobile Real Estate, the Court will take Vidya Drolia as if it
originated in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Second,
the procedural facts of Vidya Drolia must be interpreted differently to fit the mold for an
American court to decide them. First, the order requesting a Section 11 appointment of
arbitrators145 must be interpreted instead as an order to compel arbitration. 146 Next, the party
opposing this motion must have their arguments construed as follows: the respondent must be
interpreted to have objected to the motion to compel arbitration because of lack of
arbitrability in the matter.147 The complainant would then have moved to compel arbitration
to have the arbitrator decide the question of substantive arbitrability. Because this paper is
most interested in threshold questions of arbitrability, the analysis will focus on this question
of whether the court or the arbitrator should decide whether the claim is arbitrable.
The law typically treats questions of substantive arbitrability as matters for the court
to decide.148 A party may delegate questions of substantive arbitrability to the arbitrator by

141

Id.
Vidya II, (2021) 2 SCC 1 at ¶ 69, 92–95.
143
Keep in mind that this decision to compel arbitration would not be a discretionary decision by the court. If
the court finds that the arbitrator should decide, they must compel arbitration on the matter regardless of the
merits of the dispute. Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer and White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524, 530 (2019).
144
See, e.g., Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 75 (2010) (an example of when Federal Courts
must look to state contract law is unconscionability and severability).
145
Vidya II, (2021) 2 SCC 1 ¶ 2.
146
Mobile Real Est., LLC v. NewPoint Media Grp., LLC, 460 F. Supp. 3d 457, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (stating
the legal standard for deciding a motion to compel arbitration is similar to the standard for summary judgment).
147
This is similar to the argumentation in Mobile Real Est. but lacks the added nuance of having two
agreements (one with an arbitration agreement and one with a forum selection clause) as was the case in Mobile
Real Est. Id. at 463–64.
148
See Howsam v. Dean Wittter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002).
142

138
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2022/iss1/10

12

Sivils: Questions of Arbitrability in the World: Comparing the Jurisprude

Questions of Arbitrability in the World: Comparing the Jurisprudence of the United States
and India
contract.149 Whether delegation of questions of substantive arbitrability has occurred is a
threshold question of arbitrability.150
Courts are instructed, by precedent, to consider facts in favor of compelling
arbitration,151 but the burden shifts when considering whether parties have delegated issues of
arbitrability to the arbitrator.152 The test for whether parties have delegated questions of
substantive arbitrability to the arbitrator is by “clear and unmistakabl[e]” evidence. 153 The
test can be further qualified as looking for “clear and unmistakable” evidence within the
arbitration agreement for intent of the parties to delegate questions of arbitrability. 154
Furthermore, when parties explicitly adopt arbitral rules that allow for arbitrators to answer
issues of arbitrability, then that incorporation of rules serves as “clear and unmistakable”
evidence of the parties’ intent to delegate.155
In this case, neither party disputes the existence of an arbitration agreement. 156 The
question is whether there is “clear and unmistakable” evidence of intent to delegate questions
of arbitrability contained within the arbitration agreement. 157 The parties’ arbitration
agreement, Clause 23, contains language that indicates that the arbitration will be governed by
the ACA.158 Therefore, the question is whether the ACA gives arbitrators the power to
decide questions of substantive arbitrability.
To answer this question requires a reading of both the ACA Section 16 and its
American companion in the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules (hereinafter CAR) R-7(a),
while keeping in mind that the AAA’s R-7(a) has been held to be “clear and unmistakable”
evidence of intent to delegate.159 The CAR R-7 reads “[t]he arbitrator shall have the power to
rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence,
scope, or validity of the arbitration agreement or to the arbitrability of any claim or
counterclaim.”160 Here, the language is clear that an arbitrator has the authority to hear the
objections with respect to “the arbitrability of any claim or counterclaim.”161 The ACA does
not contain such clear language.
ACA Section 16 reads, in relevant part, “[t]he arbitral tribunal may rule on its own
jurisdiction, including ruling on any objections with respect to the existence or validity of the
149

Id.
See Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer and White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524, 527 (2019) (discussing the matter of
whether the contract delegates issues of substantive arbitrability to the arbitrator as “threshold arbitrability
question[s]”).
151
First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944-45 (1995) (discussing the weight of authority
encouraging the court to resolve cases concerning the scope of arbitrable issues in favor arbitration) (quoting
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Contr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983)).
152
Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 944–45.
153
See Howsam, 537 U.S. at 83.
154
See Mobile Real Est., LLC v. NewPoint Media Grp., LLC, 460 F. Supp. 3d 457, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2020)
(citing All. Bernstein Inv. Rsch. & Mgmt., Inc. v. Schaffran, 445 F.3d 121, 125 (2d Cir. 2006)).
155
See Henry Schein, Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 529.
156
See Vidya I, (2019) 358 SCC ¶ 2(i)–(iii).
157
See Mobile Real Est., 460 F. Supp. at 469 (citing All. Bernstein Inv. Rsch. & Mgmt., Inc., 445 F.3d at 125).
158
See Vidya I, (2019) 358 SCC ¶ 2(iii).
159
See Mobile Real Est. LLC., 460 F. Supp. at 470.
160
AM. ARB. ASS’N, supra note 69, R-7(a).
161
Id.
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arbitration agreement[.]”162 Furthermore, ACA Section 16 subsection 3 reads “[a] plea that
the arbitral tribunal is exceeding the scope of its authority shall be raised as soon as the matter
alleged to be beyond the scope of its authority is raised during the arbitral proceedings.” 163
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, ACA Section 16 Subsection 5 reads, in relevant part
that an “arbitral tribunal shall decide on a plea referred to in … sub-section (3) and, where the
arbitral tribunal takes a decision rejecting the plea, continue with arbitral proceedings…”164
Unlike the CAR R-7, the ACA Section 16 contains no mention of the word
“arbitrability.”165 But, there are still likely two avenues to understanding the ACA Section 16
as delegating questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator. Of these two avenues, only one is
possible.
The first avenue would require the Court to read the instructive decision in Vidya
Drolia, which makes clear that Indian courts interpret the ACA to limit the court’s
participation to finding out whether a valid arbitration agreement exists between the parties.166
But, it simply is not fair to say that the court should “read the opinion” of the case that it is
now hypothetically being tasked with deciding. If an American court were to decide Vidya
Drolia, then there would not be a Vidya Drolia opinion to read before deciding the case.
Because of that, the Court would likely dismiss this avenue from consideration.
The second avenue requires a nuanced, and perhaps argumentative reading, of ACA
Section 16 Subsection 3 and 5 and the decisions in Howsam and Henry Schein. First, the
ACA interpretation required for this avenue involves the pleas for arbitrators going beyond
the scope of arbitration.167 This avenue would require interpreting those sections as allowing
arbitrators to decide objections to instances where the arbitrator has gone beyond their
authority to decide disputes. Construed like this, the ACA seems to give arbitrators the power
to answer questions of arbitrability as defined in Howsam.168 If one accepts that questions of
arbitrability hinge on whether the arbitrator has authority to decide a matter, then it should be
amenable that objections to scope necessarily involve a decision on whether the arbitrator has
the authority to decide a matter. Henry Schein is helpful to this avenue because of its
apparent deference to towards arbitration agreements and rules governing arbitration. 169
Ultimately, there is a big difference between the CAR R-7 and the ACA Section 16.
The difference is that CAR R-7 explicitly states that arbitrators may respond to objections
over “arbitrability of any claim[.]” 170 Despite the possibility for interpretations that would
construe ACA Section 16 as granting arbitrators the power to decide questions of arbitrability,
one must remember the presumption in favor of a court deciding these matters that was
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The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, supra note 101, § 16.
Id. § 16(3).
164
Id. § 16(5).
165
Compare AM. ARB. ASS’N, supra note 69, R-7(a) with The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, supra note
101, § 16.
166
See Vidya I, (2019) 358 SCC ¶ 75.
167
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, supra note 101, § 16, (3), (5).
168
See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 85 (2002) (discussing the difference between
substantive arbitrability and threshold procedural matters).
169
See generally Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer and White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524, 526 (2019) (holding that
once a court has found that questions of arbitrability have been delegated that a court may go no further in its
analysis, not even a “wholly groundless” argument may be heard by the court).
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announced in Howsam.171 While it is not impossible that an American court hearing Vidya
Drolia would decide differently,172 it seems more likely that a court would hold that the
incorporation of the ACA rules was not “clear and unmistakable” evidence of the parties’
intent to delegate questions of arbitrability to an arbitrator.
In practical terms this would mean that the Supreme Court of the United States
would likely not compel arbitration on the question of whether the matter in Vidya Drolia is
arbitrable. Instead, the Court would decide for itself whether the matter was arbitrable. The
Court would likely reach this result even though the parties incorporated the ACA into their
arbitration agreement. This is because the ACA Section 16, which governs arbitral
jurisdiction, does not explicitly state that arbitrators may decide issues of arbitrability. 173
IV. CONCLUSION
The United State and India have similarities in terms of their jurisprudence on
arbitrability. Both countries have statutes that govern the topic, and both countries’ supreme
courts interpret those statutes.174 Despite these similarities, the countries have differences in
their law governing arbitrability.175 In a recent decision by the Supreme Court of India, Vidya
Drolia, the Court stated that the rule was “when in doubt, do refer [to arbitration].” 176 This
rule accompanied a ruling that the court would refer the parties to arbitration. 177
This paper answers the query: what would the result be if the party seeking
arbitration in Vidya Drolia had sought to compel arbitration on the question of arbitrability in
the United States? The answer to this question is not perfectly clear. 178 However, it is likely
that the United States Supreme Court would not compel arbitration on the question of
arbitrability. This illustrates the stark differences between the countries’ seemingly similar
laws governing arbitrability. This indicates that a country can legislate a pro-arbitration stance
in more than one way.
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See Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84–85.
Truly, the court that decided Vidya I in real life limited their involvement in the decision to deciding
whether there existed a valid arbitration agreement. See Vidya I, (2019) 358 SCC ¶ 75.
173
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, supra note 101, § 16.
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Id. §§ 53, 54.
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Vidya I, (2019) 358 SCC ¶ 75(d).
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Id. ¶ 2.
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